Sophistic Impressions of the Hermaphrodite as Dissident Intellectual Through Danilo Kis by Bose, Dev Kumar
 
 
Sophistic Impressions of the Hermaphrodite as Dissident Intellectual 
Through Danilo Kis 
 
This paper argues that alienation of the intellectual is informed by theories of the First 
and Second Sophistic as well as of post-Marxists.  By cycling through provisional 
historical groupings of the disconnected term “sophists,” we see how the waves have 
evolved to create sophistic impressions of the hermaphrodite.  Next I demonstrate how 
the hermaphrodite is envisioned in post-Marxist conceptions of species-being, which 
postmodern critics contend have created a contradiction between desire and reason.  
Evidence for this involved with identity politics and subsequent alienation of the 
intellectual.  Lastly, after Danilo Kis’s novel Hourglass and is adduced as evidence for 
alienation of the intellectual, I conclude by assessing counter-arguments. 
 
1. First and Second Sophistic Waves 
Gorgias of Leontini (5th century BCE) is classified among the First Sophists.  Scott 
Consigny understands Gorgias’s rhetoric as being attached to community:  “Gorgias ... 
sees [intellectuals] as being fashioned through participation in the institutions and 
customs of their community, and ... he construes the community as a contingent 
association of individuals held together by shared activities rather than by ethnicity or 
adherence to fixed moral principles.”1  The intellectual represents social interactions 
constituting him as an essence shaped by others, as a figure of the community.  Consigny 
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shows that in what begins to emerge as an egalitarian way of thinking, sophists are little 
concerned with the rhetoric of individuality and self-fulfillment. 
 
Rosamond Kent Sprague recalls “an illustration of the warning issued to the sophists by 
Socrates ... ‘to be careful not to talk in front of a large group; the listeners are likely to 
master (the eristic technique) right away and give you no credit.’”2  It is ironic that, 
despite the necessity of egalitarian thought as means of emphasizing public speech, 
intellectuals like Gorgias are overpowered by marginalization.  While Sprague continues 
Consigny’s thought, it is important to consider the relationship between alienation and its 
beginning stages in the first sophistic wave. 
 
It was not always safe to be a sophist, since dissidence was a key characteristic of the 
profession.  The marginalization of the intellectual is a common theme in the literature of 
“sophists.”  While James Stuart Murray argues that “twin sophistic claims to answer any 
question put to them and to speak more briefly than anyone else” are misconstrued [as 
being] a Socratic method in use before Plato,3 G. B. Kerferd stakes an opposing claim:  
“It is true that [Protagoras] declares that they concealed their activities and did not 
declare themselves as sophists. But Protagoras is using the term in its later sense of 
professional teacher of virtue.”4  These claims demonstrate the problem in classifying the 
“sophists” under an umbrella term; while Murray seeks to eliminate any sense of 
uniqueness in their rhetorical approach, Kerferd rehabilitates the sophistic position 
through praise of their teaching abilities.  
 
  3 
The hermaphroditic aspect of the intellectual comes across in the age of the Second 
Sophistic during the 2nd century CE.  This era, famously chronicled by Philostratus in The 
Lives of the Sophists, was “eclipsed for centuries ‘because there were no decent speakers’ 
(in which line ‘decent’ means ‘well to do’).”5  While Philostratus’s aim in writing the 
book is to assemble anecdotes and criticisms, Maud Gleason demonstrates that he 




Favorinus boasted of himself as anomalous; evidently he thought of himself as 
unique.  He seems to have generated his identity from contradictions.  As a 
philosopher, he stressed the instability of human knowledge.  He defended the 
Academic practice of arguing both sides of the same question and attacked the 
Stoics’ claim for the reliability of sense-perception.6 
 
 
Gleason cites Favorinus as a playful rhetorician of the Second Sophistic.  Victor J.  
Vitanza argues that Favorinus’ discourse goes beyond rational argument, that it is “fully 
open to flights and fugues of the imagination.”7  Favorinus represents the Second 
Sophistic in his desire to liberate discourse.   However, I want to make a clear distinction 
here.  A “Third Sophistic” emerges as extension of the First and Second waves, and 
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Favorinus, as the most atypical of the Second Sophists and as a physical hermaphrodite, 
consequently represents the Third.     
 
 
2. Critical and Post-Marxist Rhetorics  
There is reason to view post-Marxist rhetorics in light of the First and Second Sophistic 
waves, as with reference to libidinal economy Georges Bataille, Jean-Francois Lyotard, 
and Louis Althusser suggest.  I argue that the marginalized intellectual is a 
hermaphroditic creature—a Dionysian figure subject to fragmentation and ultimately, 
banishment.8   
 
The language of the intellectual gets lost through the discourse of one critic refers to as 
the restrictive economy.  Bataille discusses the catastrophe that occurs on a global scale 
when products that have been created in excess are destroyed.  Although we are led to 
reabsorb part of the value through leisure time, “these diversions have always been 
inadequate:  Their existence in excess ... has perpetually doomed multitudes of human 
beings and great quantities of useful goods.”9  Bataille blames this waste of precious 
resources on the shift towards restrictive economy, one that is “doomed to destruction or 
at least to unproductive use without any possible profit.”10  Bataille calls for a drastic 
rethinking of economic production that avoids producing more product than is needed—
and in so doing, subsumes national views to those of a general economy that focuses on a 
global re-negotiation of ecological waste. 
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The reason for discussing Bataille’s economies here is twofold.  For one thing, it is a way 
to create adjacency between Marxist political economy and its desire-laden counterpart, 
libidinal economy.  For another, from Lyotard’s biting critique of Marx emerges a 
libidinal economy, which intersects with Bataille’s understanding of the evils of 
excessive spending in a non-communal, individualistic society.  Lyotard compares the 
libidinal economy to a Moebian band, “a labour which prints these particular folds and 
twists, the effect of which is a box closed upon itself, filtering impulses and allowing only 
those to appear on the stage which come from ... the exterior.”11  The libidinal economy 
is the center of the hermaphrodite’s intellectual discourse; at the same time, it is what 
binds hem to the world by restricting hir to strictly individualist lines of thought.    
 
The analogy of the Moebian band expresses the development of the intellectual as a 
hermaphrodite.  Lyotard emphasizes this point by cajoling the Marxist: “the little girl 
Marx, offended by the perversity of the polymorphous body of capital, requires a great 
love ... Karl Marx, assigned the task of [prosecuting] the perverts and the ‘invention’ of a 
suitable lover (the proletariat), sets himself to study the file of the accursed capitalist.”12  
Lyotard uses the metaphor of the detective and the little girl to demonstrate how scandal 
occurs the detective’s quest becomes objectified.  Because Marx appears as a little girl 
caught on the Moebian band, Lyotard argues that the proletariat’s struggle is a heist that 
provides for nothing more than the illusion of equality:  “You believe that there is an 
exchange, says the little girl Marx, but under all exchanges of equal value there is an 
original gift, an irreversible relation of inequality, making all equalities ... illusory.”13  I 
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claim that this is the fate of the intellectual as well—by being termed an outcast for hir 
playfulness, s/he becomes ignored and thus marginalized. 
 
Confirming this claim, a more accurate representation of the hermaphrodite as a societal 
reject is outlined in Foucault’s Herculin Barbin, where the author in the memoirs of a 
hermaphrodite details imposition of sexual norms.  As Patricia Caplan notes, “Herculin 
Barbin is a paean to the ‘happy limbo to a non-identity’ and a warning of the dire 
consequences of insisting upon a true identity hidden behind the ambiguities of outward 
appearance ... Identity becomes an imposition.”14  Just as the hermaphrodite is completely 
pushed from the scene as a person living on the edge of what is perceived to “normal,” so 
the intellectual—as a broken off individual excluded from the concept of the whole—is 
lost upon the sea of normalized appearances, doomed to the nether-regions of society. 
 
Althusser seeks to answer this contradiction in terms by focusing on what he sees as the 
failure of the Marxist revolution:  “The oversight ... is not to see what one sees, the 
oversight no longer concerns the object, but the sight itself.”15  If this is the case, then we 
must look back to Walter Benjamin’s reminder to analyze the reflection of the neon sign 
and not the sign itself.  Thus the oversight is one “that concerns vision:  non-vision is 
therefore inside vision, it is a form of vision and hence has a necessary relationship with 
vision.”16  The analogy of vision emphasizes both passive spectacle and active 
engagement between the discourse-object (labor force) and the discourse (capitalist 
superstructure); at the same time, it places species-being within the realm of vision, 
which will be significant as we move on to the visionary nature of Kis’s writing.   
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The importance of Althusser’s argument is to show the lens through which intellectuals 
have been regarded.  By calling for a paradigmatic shift in thinking about political 
economy, one that uses the analogy of vision to formulate a mode of reasoning based on 
production, we need to re-view the intellectual as one who has been alienated:  “We must 
completely reorganize the idea we have of knowledge, we must abandon the mirror 
myths of immediate vision and reading, and conceive knowledge as a production” 
(emphasis added).17  This is an important shift in Althusser’s reconstituting of Marxist 
thought in that he replaces its core concept, money, with knowledge—and the 
intellectual’s brand of knowledge becomes cultural capital.  According to the 
Althusserian brand of Marxism, then, knowledge may be seen as being both a tangible 
product plus an abstract means of negotiation.  
 
3. Transition:  Identity Politics 
In Outside the Teaching Machine, Spivak covers a lot of ground adducing both her own 
and Derrida’s work to critique Marxism, to establish paradox, and to re-conceive 
community.  One way she does so is by referring to the danger of identity politics, which 
she argues is one of Marxism’s intentional consequences: “Identitarianism can be as 
dangerous as it is powerful, and the radical teacher in the university can hope to work, 
however indirectly, toward controlling the dangers by making them visible.”18  While 
Spivak is a proponent of radical teaching at the university, she warns against the danger 
of its inherent politicizing.  By arguing that identity politics unintentionally creates 
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boundaries, Spivak implies that academic Marxism carries serious 
antidisestablishmentarian consequences for the curriculum. 
 
Coupled with this fatal flaw is the construct of alienation shared with reactionary 
theorists.  Spivak continues, “A word to name the margin.  Perhaps that is what the 
audience wanted to hear:  a voice from the margin.  If there is a buzzword in cultural 
critique now, it is ‘marginality.’  Every academic knows that one cannot do without 
labels.”19  Spivak’s critique of academic Marxism is twofold:  (1) by referring to it as 
“cultural critique” she notes the narrowness of its contextual specificity; on the other 
hand, (2) conservatives downplay marginality, on the same level as identity politics.  
While Theresa Ebert20 has rebutted Spivak’s work, arguing for what has been construed 
as the failure of identity politics, I argue that Spivak’s valuable contributions to the 
discussion of identity politics outweigh such criticism.  This is confirmed in Kis’s work, 
which embodies the theories discussed so far by demonstrating that the intellectual is 
both an alienated figure and a dissident. 
 
4. Kis, Transnational Identity, and Counter-Arguments 
In Kis’s novel Hourglass, E.S. is a character whose fate has already been decided for 
him; he is a Jew whose family was murdered in the Holocaust.  The reader is forced to 
put the pieces of his life together, and given that the audience is provided with an array of 
fragmented narratives ranging from interrogation scenes to deranged mental wanderings, 
the facts of E.S.’s life are not easy to ascertain.  Kis effects this by intermittently shifting 
between third person omniscient and first person narratives; by doing so, the he presents 
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the story in such a way as to capture the sympathy of the reader as we relive the 
experience of E.S.  The philosophical laboriousness of Kis’s narrative gives the novel a 
Kunderaesque presence, an alienatory confinement within the restrictive economy of the 
very text.   
 
On the other hand, the characters appear to be almost as unrealistic as they are realistic, 
and this is precisely for the same reason: it seems almost impossible for outcasts on the 
lower rungs of the social ladder ever really to succeed.  As Branko Gorjup points out, 
“Kis formulates his plots from historically and politically relevant material, from those 
referents that stem from an actual political world.”21  Gorjup argues that it is Kis’s lived 
experience that allows him to re-create the Event.  
 
Is not the idea of an alienated intellectual historically specific?  Numerous authors from 
Central and Eastern Europe suffered oppression because of their work.  Danilo Kis, 
whose work up to now has not been critically studied in the English language, stands out 
from those other writers because he wrote throughout the 70s and 80s as an alienated 
intellectual.  Moreover, he died at a critical point in CEE history, right before the break-
up of Yugoslavia.  I believe that the present moment signals a crucial time to speak about 
the intellectual again. 
 
Is not the idea of an alienated intellectual a feature of late modernism?  The theory of 
alienation at an intellectual level does stem from that earlier period, and s/he may be seen 
as a leftover from a bygone age.  Kis, however, transcends his temporal  setting because 
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of his narrative strategy, which is very fragmented and lends itself well to post-
structuralist analysis.  The broken-up nature of his writing makes him comparable to 
contemporary postmodern writers. 
 




Conscious organic intellectuals—to use Gramsci's term (1986)—bear the 
Palestinian past as, what Said calls, “scars of humiliating wounds, as instigation 
for different practices, as potentially revised versions of the past tending towards a 
post-colonial future, as urgently reinterpretable and redeployable experiences, in 
which the formerly silent native speaks and acts on territory reclaimed as part of a 
general movement of resistance, from the colonist.”22  
 
 
Eid discusses the role of the intellectual as described by Gramsci and Said.  Alienated 
intellectuals are persons who have been shunned from the system, including critical 
theorists interested in changing the state of the world but who are oppressed for doing so.  
Confined to the ivory tower, intellectuals are often seen as disconnected from the rest of 
the world.  But I am interested in exploring how intellectuals, through their 
(mis)perceived disconnection, are alienated.  In addition to Said and Gramsci, Bhaba’s 
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elitism that stems from being a Parsi and a Harvard scholar also exemplifies the alienated 
intellectual as an isolated fragment. 
 
How does an alienated intellectual differ from an immigrant?  While many expatriates 
happen to be intellectuals, not all intellectuals are immigrants.  While ethnicity may play 
a key role with many of the scholars in my project of study, it is often a position of 
subalternity that dictates the identity of transnational authors, causing them to be 
overlooked.  As Judith Butler notes, 
 
 
Spivak deftly opposes the “migrant intellectual” approach to the study of 
alterity.  In its places she insists upon a practice of cultural translation that resists 
the appropriation of dominant power and engages in the specificity of writing 
within subaltern sites in the idiomatic and vexed relation to the effacements of 
cultural erasure and cultural appropriation.”23 
 
 
Kis’s identity as a transnational writer reinforces the idea that the intellectual is alienated, 
since he lived in France as a displaced Yugoslavian.  This project considered the theme of 
immigration as being simply one aspect of the more comprehensive subalternity of the 
alienated intellectual. 
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It is difficult to determine the extent to which early Sophistic and post-Marxist rhetorics 
share common ground.  My approach is different from other researchers in that my aim is 
to create a pathway between them in terms of what happens to the intellectual as a 
marginalized hermaphrodite.  The aim of this section is to study the literature of the 
oppressed.  The intention of this project is to begin establishing commonalities between 
these categories that will refine methods of critical inquiry to apply to literary study and 
critical pedagogies.  
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